Instructions
Choose ONE document from the following sources and write a response paper:
- Primary sources: texts that were written in the time period you are asked about;
- Secondary sources: texts written by later historians that explain the time period;
- Multimedia sources: typically artworks – cartoons, posters, paintings, videos – from the time period.
There is no suggested prompt, nor any length requirement for your responses. You are free to approach the source material in any way you see fit. You may also consult any external sources, such as your notes and the Internet (including generative AI), provided that you give proper citations.
Once you begin, you will have 120 minutes to complete the exam. Good luck!
Primary Source: Du Mu, “Ode to Epang Palace”
Fu (Chinese: 賦), often translated as “rhapsody” or “poetic exposition,” is a form of Chinese rhymed prose that was the predominant literary style during the Han dynasty (206 BC – AD 220). Fu serves as an intermediary between poetry and prose, providing exhaustive descriptions of a place, object, feeling, or other subjects from multiple perspectives. A notable aspect of the fu’s legacy is its use as a medium for sociopolitical protest, often highlighting themes such as the loyal minister unjustly exiled by those in power at court, who fails to receive the promotion and respect he truly deserves.
In this section, you will encounter one of the most celebrated works of Chinese literature, the Epang Palace Ode (Epang gongfu 阿房宮賦). After Qin Shi Huang forcibly united the Warring States in 221 BCE, he took a number of measures to establish his authority, including giving himself a title – commonly translated into English as “Emperor” — that was previously used only for semi-divine figures. Among these efforts included a number of grand construction projects, such as building roads and defensive walls. One such project was the Epang Palace, a grand palace built on the south bank of the Wei River.
The rhapsody, the Epang Palace Ode (Epang gongfu 阿房宮賦) composed by the late Tang poet Du Mu 杜牧 (803–852). Born in the Tang capital of Chang’an (modern Xi’an) into the declining elite family of the Jingzhao Du clan, Du Mu held various official positions throughout his life but never achieved a high rank, possibly due to the enemies he made during factional disputes at the imperial court. From 842 onward, he served as governor of several small, impoverished rural prefectures, leading to his growing dissatisfaction and feelings of failure regarding his career.
During Du Mu’s lifetime, the political landscape of the Tang Empire became increasingly chaotic, marked by the rise of powerful regional lords and invasions from Tibet, the Nanzhao army (present-day Yunnan), and the Uyghur army (present-day Xinjiang). In his Letter to My Confidant, Du Mu remarked, “During the Baoli era (the reign of Emperor Jingzong of Tang), there was a grand construction of palaces and an expansion of extravagant displays, which inspired me to compose the Epang Palace Ode.”
Six kings finished, one empire united. Shu Mountain stands tall, A’fang Palace emerges.
Covering over three hundred li, isolated from the sun.
Li Mountain stretches north and bends west, directly heading towards Xianyang.
The two rivers merge, flowing into the palace walls. Every five steps, a tower; every ten steps, a pavilion.
The corridors curl and twist, the eaves sharp and high. Each embraces its own terrain, intertwining and competing.
Coiling and circling, buzzing and humming, beehives and swirling waters, countless in number.
The long bridge lies across rippling waves, what dragon does it resemble? The winding path stretches through empty space, when will the rainbow appear?
High and low, dim and perplexed, not knowing east from west. The singing stage warms with echoes, the spring light melts.
The dance hall chills with lonely sleeves, the wind and rain are dreary.
Within a single day, within a single palace, the climates do not align.
—
Concubines and consorts, princes and imperial heirs, descending from the towers, carried to Qin.
Morning songs and night strings, for the women of the Qin palace. Bright stars shimmer, reflecting in the makeup mirror.
Green clouds flutter, combing their morning hair. The Wei River swells with grease, as they abandon their cosmetic water.
Smoke slants, mist hangs, burning pepper and orchid. Thunder suddenly startles, as the palace carriage passes by.
The rumbling sounds are heard from afar, their destination unknown.
Every muscle and every appearance, exhibiting the utmost beauty. Standing far away, gazing hopefully,
Yet there are those who cannot be seen for thirty-six years.
—
Yan and Zhao’s treasures, Han and Wei’s prosperity, Qi and Chu’s elites, for generations and years,
They were captured and plundered, piled up like mountains. Suddenly, they could not possess them, losing them in between.
Ding and chimes, jade and stones, discarded and scattered. The people of Qin, also not cherishing them greatly.
Alas! The heart of one person is the heart of millions.
Qin loved extravagance, and people also longed for their families.
But why take every last bit, using it like mud and sand!
Making the burden of pillars greater than the farmers’ fields;
The load of beams greater than the girls at their looms;
The number of nails shining, greater than the grains in the granaries;
The gaps in the roof tiles, more numerous than the threads of silk on one’s body;
The straight bars and horizontal fences, more numerous than the city walls;
The sounds of music and instruments, more numerous than the words of the townspeople:
Causing the people of the world to dare not speak but to dare to be angry.
The heart of the lone ruler becomes increasingly arrogant and stubborn.
The soldiers shout, Han Valley rises. One torch from Chu, pity the scorched earth.
—
Alas! The ones who destroyed the six states were the six states themselves, not Qin.
Those who annihilated Qin were Qin itself, not the whole world.
Alas! If each of the six states loved their own people, they would have been enough to resist Qin.
If Qin had also loved the people of the six states,
Then through generations, they could have become rulers for ten thousand years, who would have been able to annihilate them?
The people of Qin did not have time to mourn, and later generations mourned them.
Later generations mourned them, but failed to reflect, thus causing later generations to mourn themselves again.
Secondary Source: Han vs. Xiongnu
The war with the Xiongnu, measured both by the vast geographical space in which it took place and by the intensity of the campaigns and the level of human and material resources both sides threw into the confrontation, was unprecedented in world history. After decades of policies that oscillated between open confrontation, diplomatic negotiations, and appeasement (such as the policy of “marriage for peace 和親”), what prompted Emperor Wu of Han (Hanwudi 漢武帝, 156 BCE-87 BCE) to launch an all-out campaign against the northern steppe people, and how did the campaign change the Han Empire? In the following excerpt, Nicola Di Cosmo, Professor in East Asian Studies at the Institute for Advanced Study, examines this pivotal moment in Chinese frontier history.
Note that Di Cosmos uses Wade-Giles instead of pinyin for transliterating Chinese concepts. For your reference, here’s a conversion table:
| 周 |
Chou |
Zhou |
Zhou Dynasty |
| 匈奴 |
Hsiung-nu |
Xiongnu |
Xiongnu Confederation |
| 漢武帝 |
Han Wu-ti |
Hanwudi |
Emperor Wu of Han |
| 羌 |
Ch’iang |
Qiang |
Qiang tribe (from the mountainous region on the eastern edge of the Tibetan Plateau) |
Source: Nicola Di Cosmo, Ancient China and Its Enemies: The Rise of Nomadic Power in East Asian History (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 227-229.
The Han dynasty expanded territorially far beyond the boundaries held by the Chou states, and by the mid-first century b.c. the northern hegemony of the Hsiung-nu empire was broken. The conquest of the north increased the Han administrative network in the northern border areas and strengthened and rationalized the border defense system with military garrisons, fixed fortifications, and settlements. The Han western expansion as far as the Tarim Basin led to the submission of a plethora of small states and to the establishment of commercial ties with Central Asia.
These feats were most successfully carried out between 121 and 112 B.C., and gradually consolidated during and after the reign of Emperor Wu. Yet the motives behind Han Wu-ti’s decision to embark on an unprecedented program of territorial expansion are not fully clear, nor can they be clarified without our first considering the actual military capabilities of the Han, the extent to which the Hsiung-nu empire had grown, and the nature of Hsiung-nu economic and political power. A long view is required to determine, for instance, whether the Han expansion was planned or was, on the contrary, the end-product of a piecemeal process. One of the most puzzling features of Wu-ti’s wars against the Hsiung-nu is that none of the stated objectives of the Han offensive seems to justify either the duration of the war or the extent to which the Han armies advanced into Hsiung-nu territory. Even the most hawkish positions expressed during the debates that accompanied the shift from a pacifist to a militarist posture did not advocate anything like the results eventually achieved. There was no military or political strategy elaborated in this period that even remotely justified the decades of military offensives, political expansion, and territorial acquisition that were in fact to follow.
Arguments in favor of the expansion were expressed post facto in the Discourses on Salt and Iron by the “realist” faction of the government officials. These arguments can be summarized in two points: border defense and trade opportunities. According to the “ministerial” faction, which supported military intervention, Wu-ti had been driven to expansion by the need to protect the central kingdom. The conquest of Hsiung-nu territory and the establishment of commanderies in the north and west were intended to guarantee peace in the rest of the kingdom. It was, in other words, an instance of “defensive acquisition” rather than true expansion. Moreover, the benefits to be derived from trade were enormous, because by expanding into these lands China could trade goods of which it had a surplus (and which were therefore next to worthless on the internal market), for things of value, such as gold, pack animals, furs, and other precious objects. To this, the opposite faction – the “literati” – replied polemically, with the usual critique, that in pursuing an expansionist policy, the emperor intended to increase his power and aggrandize the state at the expense of the welfare of the people, who became bankrupt in the process. As for the hypothetical commercial benefits, those imported goods were not nearly worth the Chinese products exchanged for them; once all expenses – including transportation and all phases of production – had been calculated, the cost of the Chinese goods was far higher than that of the imported items.
However, neither of these relatively limited objectives could justify subduing independent polities (even those that were not hostile) and bringing distant lands, far beyond the Han frontiers, under Chinese rule. To comprehend the reasons that led the Han to displace the power of the Hsiungnu throughout the north, and to establish their own supremacy in Central Asia, we must examine two aspects of the context in which this strategy emerged. The first is purely military: it involves the development by the Han of the ability to launch long-ranging military expeditions, and the tactical solution adopted by Han Wu-ti of consolidating territorial gains by turning the conquered regions into administrative areas, which were then incorporated within the empire. These areas supported a line of fortifications that provided logistical support to Chinese armies pushing farther and farther west, and therefore constituted the vertebral column of the Han expansion into the Western Regions.
The second aspect is strategic and refers to the discovery made by the Han that the war against the Hsiung-nu could not have been won without severing the essential economic and political links between the Hsiung-nu and other polities, in particular the kingdoms of the Tarim Basin and the Ch’iang. This strategy, which was referred to as “cutting the right arm” of the Hsiung-nu, required the direct Han intervention in the Western Regions; it was the dogged pursuance of this strategy that eventually provoked a fatal split in the Hsiung-nu leadership and marked the end of the Hsiungnu empire.
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